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Wilderness, the Wild, and Aesthetic Appreciation  
 
Wild nature is a source of wonder and inspiration in part because of its aesthetic value. This paper gives an 
account of the aesthetic value of wilderness and argues that wild nature is especially likely to give rise to 
what it will call the transformative aesthetic experience. This account satisfies three criteria John Fisher 
suggests for a good account of nature’s aesthetic value that might provide reasons for preservation. First, it 
retains a credible connection with canonical aesthetic theory. Second, it allows us to make a general 
distinction between our appreciation of nature and art. Third, it avoids the ‘the human intervention’ or 
‘positive value’ dilemma.1 It explains what is especially important aesthetically about undeveloped nature, 
nature that is free from human intervention, without making ‘the appreciation of nature in mixed and 
influenced environments inexplicable.’2 
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Wilderness, the Wild, and Aesthetic Appreciation3  
 
I. Introduction 
Wild nature is a source of wonder and inspiration in part because of its aesthetic value. This paper 
gives an account of the aesthetic value of wilderness and argues that wild nature is especially likely to give 
rise to what it will call the transformative aesthetic experience. This account satisfies three criteria John 
Fisher suggests for a good account of nature’s aesthetic value that might provide reasons for preservation or 
conservation (henceforth preservation).4 First, it retains a credible connection with canonical aesthetic 
theory. Second, it allows us to make a general distinction between our appreciation of nature and art. Third, 
it avoids the ‘the human intervention’ or ‘positive value’ dilemma.5 It explains what is especially important 
aesthetically about undeveloped nature, nature that is free from human intervention, without making ‘the 
appreciation of nature in mixed and influenced environments inexplicable.’6 The next section says a few 
words about wilderness and the wild. Section III sets out the account. Section IV explains how it allows us 
to make a general distinction between our appreciation of nature and art. Section V illustrates how the 
account allows us to avoid the positive value dilemma. Finally, section VI considers and responds to 
objections. 
II. Wilderness, and the Wild 
 
There is no clean distinction between wilderness and mixed or influenced environments. Rather, 
there is a continuum of influence and wilderness. So, this paper will reserve the terms ‘wild nature,’ 
‘wilderness,’ or ‘uninfluenced nature’ for the extreme end of the spectrum. Pure wilderness would be made 
up only of things that were not the result of human influence and, especially, attempts to control - ‘what 
takes place without the voluntary and intentional agency of man.’7 Air pollution from cars, then, is not wild 
as it is clearly a result (though unintended) of human attempts at controlling the energy resources of the 
world for transportation. Trimmed bushes, too, are attempts to shape nature into our vision of it, though 
they are much closer to wilderness. Unmanaged forests are as close to pure wilderness as we can get. 
The idea of wild nature or wilderness is different than a more general conception of the wild. 
Objects are wild in this broader sense insofar as they fall in the realm between complete familiarity and 
utter strangeness; wild objects do not fit into our conceptual categories very easily, but they are objects for 
which we have such categories. Unlike ball bearings and many other human creations that -- for aesthetic 
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or practical reasons -- approximate a single ideal object, individual wild objects often have a unique form 
and ways of developing and changing over time.8  
Wild, here, is used as a technical term. I cannot think of a better term that captures things in the 
middling-realm between that which is utterly ordinary and that which is simply incomprehensible. Be that 
as it may, the important point for this paper is just that wild objects do not fit into our conceptual categories 
very easily, but they are things for which we have such categories.  
The idea of wild nature or wilderness is connected with this broader conception of the wild. Those 
things that are created free from influence and especially intentional attempts to control are usually wild in 
this sense. Perhaps the perception that something is outside the sphere of (at least easy) human control is 
essential to this conception of the wild. This may be explained by the fact that wild things fall in the realm 
between complete familiarity and utter strangeness. 
The connection between wilderness and the wild in the broader sense is, however, contingent. 
What is wild to one person may not be wild to another. If someone who has spent his or her whole live 
living in a jungle visits a McDonalds in New York, that person may find it an extremely wild place. While, 
even if the average person in New York has never seen that McDonalds, they will probably fail to find it 
wild at all.  What follows presupposes that most people do find the wilderness to be wild. It will suppose 
that, for most people, those things that are created free from influence and especially intentional attempts to 
control are usually wild.  
On this account, art objects, like natural objects, can be more or less wild, though art objects will 
mostly be less wild than air and bushes which are not human creations. Art, since it is the result of human 
influence, will usually be wilder insofar as it is created indifferently, free from intentional attempts at 
control.9 So, many abstract paintings are, for instance, wilder than many highly realistic ones.  
It is beyond this paper’s scope, however, to defend the above claims about the relationship 
between art, wilderness, and wildness. Those who are not convinced by these claims can view the 
arguments that follow as conditional upon their turning out to be veridical. The paper’s main contribution is 
to provide an account of wilderness’ aesthetic value taking these observations as given. It will do this by 
arguing that wild objects are most likely to give rise to the transformative aesthetic experience. On the 
assumption that wild nature is more likely to be wild than art, it should follow that wilderness is more 
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likely to give rise to the transformative aesthetic experience than less wild nature or art. Though nothing 
this paper will say will depend on the claim that all equally wild objects have the same aesthetic value. 
Other factors may be relevant as well. There may even be other kinds of aesthetic value in nature (and art). 
The diagram below illustrates some of the relationships this paper will suggest obtain. The line between art, 
wilderness, and nature is dotted. For this paper says nothing about whether some parts of nature can be (e.g. 
found) art. 
 
The next section will start by setting out this paper’s account of transformative aesthetic value. It 
argues that the account retains a credible connection with aesthetic theory by illustrating it with several 
canonical examples of aesthetic objects.  
III. The Transformative Aesthetic Experience and Canonical Aesthetic Theory 
In “Representation in Painting and Consciousness” Keith Lehrer argues that representation 
reconfigures or reforms experience and leads to what this paper will call the transformative aesthetic 
experience. Lehrer suggests that in order to grasp the content of an aesthetic object one must attend to its 
sensory surface without trying to control or shape the experience into what one wants it to be. It can also 
help to take appropriate contextual features of the object into account. When one does this, Lehrer argues, 
the content of an artwork allows ‘something like a gestalt phenomenon that occurs in… perception...’.10  
This paper will suggest that this re-patterning or transformation of experience is especially likely 
to occur in an aesthetic experience of wilderness. The reconfiguration transforms the content of the 
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aesthetic object and can also transform our experience of the world, model, or referent of the aesthetic 
object as we can come to see it in a new way. 
Lehrer illustrates the transformative aesthetic experience with an example. Suppose that one is 
sick in a hospital after having heart surgery and is presented with the following picture as a get-well gift: 
 
One might be inclined to think that it was a gag-gift. Suppose, however, one suddenly recognizes the artist 
as a famous Japanese painter of landscapes, or is told that this is a minimalist portrayal of the Appalachian 
Mountains. Then, the way that one sees the painting may change.11 A similar reconfiguration, hopefully, 
happened in the reader’s experience of the picture. Furthermore, if one is lucky enough to see the 
Appalachian Mountains after viewing the picture, the way that one views the model for this particular 
drawing may likewise be transformed.  
Another good example is Dali’s painting Metamorphosis of Narcissus.12  
 
http://funwavs.com/posters 
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Most people find that while attending to the figures in the foreground they come to see a person or a hand 
with an egg and flower. The title of the painting helps bring about this transition. For, according to Greek 
mythology Narcissus fell in love with his own reflection in a pool. He remained by the pool but was unable 
to embrace his own image, so the gods immortalized him as a flower. Yeats’ Men of Destiny, too, may 
serve as a particularly useful illustration. Figures emerge from the background when one attends carefully 
to the sensory content of the painting. 
 
http://www.artofeurope.com/jackyeats/jac3.htm 
In the case of nature, the transformative aesthetic experience may often be sublime. Looking at a 
tall tree, I may not at first see the whole thing. When I realize it is a tree, I may make the shift from looking 
at its lower half or its upper half independently, to seeing it all at once, and have the transformative 
experience: I may come to feel my size in relation to it. I may feel small compared to the tree, or I may feel 
that the tree is great compared to me. When this shift is large enough, many have called it an experience of 
the sublime and have associated this kind of experience with natural objects.  
The Grand Canyon provides a good example of a wild part of nature that is likely to bring about a 
sublime transformative experience. Once one recognizes that one is looking at a crack in the Earth, the 
canyon’s sheer size and depth is enough to bring about this experience.  
When one reflects on the natural history of the canyon and compares it to the history of man, one 
may have an even more transformative experience that is also, in part, conceptual. For the Grand Canyon 
has a way of making us appreciate the proportion of things. The canyon was formed by erosion and one can 
see the tiny ribbon of water from the cliffs’ edge that is the mighty Colorado River. The river has curled its 
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way through millennia of rock, the wind has helped. It is possible to study the exposed layers of sediment, 
red, blue, green, and brown to unveil history. About 10,000 years ago people were living in the canyon and 
it was home to hunter-gathers until about 1000 BC. Then Pueblo tribes settled in the area. They grew corn 
and left their homes in the national park. Today the Hualapai and Navajo nations live along the rims of the 
canyon. The Canyon also contains many minerals and silently sleeping tales of lead, zinc, asbestos, and 
copper mining misadventures. Considering that each of these stories, and even the sum of them all, is but a 
blink the history of the canyon gives us a sense of our smallness and the vastness of time, as well as space. 
The canyon is, as Paiutes said, “The Mountain Lying Down.”13 
Or consider an example from nature that illustrates how the transformative aesthetic experience 
can have both cognitive and sensual components. To use an example from R.W. Hepburn’s “Contemporary 
Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty”, walking on a wide plain of sand and mud one may have a 
sense of “wild, glad emptiness”.14 Later, if one realizes one is walking on a tidal basin, and the tide is out, 
one may see one’s self “as walking on what is for half the day sea-bed. The wild glad emptiness may be 
tempered by a disturbing weirdness”.15 As Hepburn suggests, “an aesthetic view of an object will strive to 
shake free from conventional and deadening conceptualizings”.16 
That said, when one has an aesthetic experience, the sensory experience is essential to the content 
of the aesthetic experience. The transformative experience may be primarily conceptual or emotional but 
the relevant kind of experience has an essentially sensual component. A change in sensation is necessary 
for one’s experience to be truly aesthetic, but that may be the result of, or may result in, greater cognitive 
understanding. 
Furthermore, one must attend to the sensory surface of an object to have an aesthetic experience of 
it.17 One cannot have an aesthetic experience of an object without using one’s senses. The key to attending 
to the sensory information is not that one needs to attend only to the object’s intrinsic properties,18 but it 
helps to experience the object without trying to control the experience or shape it into what one would like 
it to be.19 As the instructions for some of the most famous “Magic Eye” gestalt illusions suggest, one 
should focus on the surface or reflection of the image and relax to let the shift happen. If one tries to control 
the image as it starts to emerge it may fade, though it takes practice to develop the capacity for this kind of 
aesthetic appreciation.  
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Contextual features of aesthetic objects can also help bring about a transformative aesthetic 
experience. Contextual features are, as Peggy Brand puts it, ‘nonexhibited, relational properties’ without 
which it may be ‘impossible to fully appreciate or understand the object’.20 Unlike intrinsic features of an 
object, they are external and extrinsic. Sometimes we have to do more than establish cognitive contact with 
the world via perception, in order to attain a full and deep aesthetic experience. Although it rarely helps to 
try to shape or control the aesthetic experience, our aesthetic appreciation ‘is in many cases a function of 
our sensitivity to the broader contexts – artistic, stylistic, historical, and cultural...’.21 In fact, the aesthetic 
experience may only arise when one attends to the context of the aesthetic object.  
The point that context is important for appreciating art is well rehearsed in the literature so does 
not require much defense.22 Consider just a few examples. Recall, for instance, that it was learning that the 
get well gift was a minimalist representation of mountains that was likely to change the way one viewed the 
drawing. Or consider The Wretched of the Earth; this acknowledged masterpiece about slavery and 
oppression in Algeria would be completely impotent in a world free from such oppression. Many literary 
and theatrical pieces are famous just because of the powerful way that they were able to capture and 
illuminate the cultural context of their creation. Nor has this been isolated to the genres of literature and 
theatre. Many musical and visual masterpieces have been appreciated as social commentary or religious 
expression, and it is widely held that such pieces give rise to an important aesthetic experience partly 
because of their cultural commentary, or how they are historically situated.  
Context can also be relevant for appreciating nature. Learning about what went on in the Grand 
Canyon provides one example. Or consider an example from Aldo Leopold who explains how seeing 
cranes at a salt marsh can bring about a transformative experience, if one attends to the cranes and the 
marsh carefully and learns a bit about their history. 
Yearly since the ice age it has awakened each spring to the clangor of cranes. The peat 
layers that comprise the bog are laid down in the basin of an ancient lake. The cranes 
stand, as it were, upon the sodden pages of their own history… An endless caravan of 
generations has built of its own bones this bridge into the future, this habitat where the 
oncoming host again may live and breed and die… our appreciation of the crane grows 
with the slow unraveling of earthly history. His tribe, we now know, stems out of the 
remote Eocene. The other members of the fauna in which he originated are long since 
entombed within the hills. When we hear his call we hear no mere bird. We hear the 
trumpet in the orchestra of evolution. He is the symbol of our untamable past, of that 
incredible sweep of millennia which underlies and conditions the daily affairs of birds 
and men.23 
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Reflecting on what makes up the peat beneath the bog, one may see the marsh as made up of the bones of 
the birds and the birds as the kinds of things that are transformed into marsh. One may take comfort in the 
slow procession of natural change or view the birds as akin to a short season in the swamp’s natural 
evolution. If one learns enough about ecology one may, like Leopold and some deep ecologists, even come 
to see the world as a community and ecosystems as deeply akin to living things.24   
IV. The Difference between Art and Nature and Connection with Canonical Aesthetic Theory 
Contextual features provide one way of distinguishing between our appreciation of nature and 
art.25 Contextual features add to our understanding of an object by introducing its origin, effects, social, 
historical, or psychological contexts.26 While some contextual features influence both our appreciation of 
art and the environment, some only pertain to art and some only to the wild natural environment.27 Part of 
the context of art objects is a context of human creation – the fact that it was created and the intentions of 
the artist influence its aesthetic value. The context of wild natural objects is the natural world or 
environment; the wilderness.28 Such features are usually irrelevant to our appreciation of art objects.29 
Finally, even the way that one must appreciate context can be different for wild nature than for some art 
objects. Appreciating wild nature often requires integrating the experience of all of one’s sensory 
modalities (listening to the birds while feeling the sun on one’s skin etc.).30 Rarely must one use all of 
one’s sensory modalities to appreciate art objects (even in performance art, smell is usually unnecessary).   
This does not entail that an aesthetic experience of art is categorically different from an aesthetic 
experience of nature. The differences between the aesthetic experiences art objects and natural objects 
produce are less pronounced than that. Still, this account allows us to make a general distinction between 
our appreciation of nature and art.  
This paper’s account should also retain a credible connection with aesthetic theory. It is composed 
of components from canonical aesthetic theory and has been illustrated with many canonical examples of 
aesthetic objects. This paper draws on a theory of representation defended by Keith Lehrer. There is also 
more than a hint of this kind of account R.W. Hepburn’s work. Though, Lehrer’s account has not been 
applied to the case of wilderness and Hepburn’s account differs from this paper’s account in some 
important respects. 
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Consider just a few ways Hepburn’s account differs from this paper’s account. Hepburn seems to 
think, for instance, that the paradigmatic aesthetic experience is not a case where someone sees an aesthetic 
object as something. He also seems open to allowing us to manipulate the aesthetic experience more than 
suggested in this paper’s account. Hepburn writes that “when we contemplate a natural object, we may see 
it not as sand-dune or rock but simply as a coloured shape. If this is difficult, we can look at the world 
upside down, with our head between our legs”.31 Though, he points out that “that is not to say that all 
interpretings, all ‘seeings as …’ are lapses to the non-aesthetic”.32 We may have an aesthetic experience of 
a rock or dune precisely when we see it as a rock or dune for the first time instead of seeing just shapeless 
forms and colors or individual grains of sand. Finally, one could easily draw on other parts of Hepburn’s 
lovely article to sketch a very different account of nature’s aesthetic value. For, he points to many 
differences between our appreciation of art and nature. He points out, for example, that we are more 
involved in nature and interact with it differently than art and that we are more attached to it than art 
objects.  
Still, Hepburn highlights some key features of the transformative aesthetic experience. He says 
that in experiencing nature we can “experience an expansion of the imagination” that changes our view of 
how the world really is.33 Hepburn even emphasizes the importance of not trying to shape an aesthetic 
object into what we would like it to be in order to have a transformative experience and one can draw on 
his writing to explain why nature may be more likely to bring about this experience than art. Hepburn says 
though “we are in nature and a part of nature; we do not stand over against it as over against a painting on a 
wall”; we are in some way detached from it.34 We are “not using nature, manipulating it or calculating how 
to manipulate it”.35 One is “both actor and spectator, ingredient in the landscape and lingering upon the 
sensations of being thus ingredient, rejoicing in their multifariousness, playing actively with nature, and 
letting nature, as it were, play with” one and one’s sense of one’s self.36 To have the aesthetic experience 
one cannot just attend to “those features of a natural object or scene that most readily come together in a 
familiar pattern or which yield a comfortingly generalized emotional quality”.37 Hepburn also says that 
nature challenges our creativity because “a landscape does not minutely control the spectator’s response to 
it”.38 Finally, Hepburn suggests that although we must deal with the fact that our experience of nature is not 
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as stable and determinate as our experience of art, nature offers amazing “unpredictable perceptual 
surprises”.39 
This paper might fruitfully be viewed as extending and cashing out one account of nature’s 
aesthetic value implicit in Hepburn’s article. Subsequent sections will argue that wilderness is more likely 
than other parts of nature (and art) to bring about a transformative aesthetic experience.  
V. The Positive Value Dilemma and Reasons for Preservation 
So far, this paper has given an account of the aesthetic value of nature that retains a credible 
connection with canonical aesthetic theory and allows us to make a general distinction between our 
appreciation of nature and art. But this paper must still show that this “transformative” aesthetic experience 
is most likely to be enabled by contact with wilderness. So, the rest of this paper will argue that wild 
objects (and, so, wild aspects of nature), are especially likely to re-pattern or reconfigure one’s experience 
and enable the transformative gestalt shift in perception. This will resolve the positive value dilemma: It 
will explain why wilderness is the more likely it is to bring about this kind of experience than mixed or 
influenced environments though we can have (often less intense) appreciation for mixed and influenced 
environments.  
Making the case that the wildest objects are most likely to bring about the transformative aesthetic 
experience is also important, if the account is to provide a reason for preserving wilderness, in particular. 
Though there are also many other (e.g. prudential) reasons to preserve wilderness as well as mixed and 
influenced environments. The account already provides at least a prima facie reason for preserving many 
natural objects. For the content of the aesthetic experience of an object essentially involves that object. One 
can make paintings of paintings (or of trees) but this will not suffice to replace the aesthetic object. So, one 
can give the same argument for preserving wild objects that is sometimes given for preserving particular 
paintings. At least, if one has the conservative impulse to value the mere existence of valuable things, there 
is reason to preserve these wild objects.40 Still the aesthetic value of wild objects is essential to this 
argument for the conservative impulse is only to value the existence of (in this case aesthetically) valuable 
things.41 The preceding line of thought tells against ecosystem restoration, for instance. If wild trees were 
replaced not with plastic ones but with other trees that (for that reason) were less wild, something would 
still be lost – the content of the aesthetic experience of the existing ecosystem. Perhaps in time, something 
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valuable would also be gained. The new ecosystem may eventually become just as wild a place. Still, the 
aesthetic value of the existing ecosystem may help justify the claim that wild things have mere existence 
value. Until there is something else of value around, at least those who feel the conservative impulse, have 
reason to preserve existing nature.42 
The rest of this section will try to make the case that it is the wildest objects that are most likely to 
bring about the transformative aesthetic experience. Recall the assumption this paper started with – that 
wild nature is more likely to be wild than modified nature or art. On this assumption, the following 
arguments should provide particularly strong reasons to value wild elements of nature. So, when we must 
decide whether we should replace something wild with something completely artificial, there are particular 
reasons for preservation.  
Wild aspects of nature have aesthetic value qua wild, because one’s experience of the 
uninfluenced natural world usually re-patterns or reconfigures one’s experience in more ways than does an 
experience of nature that is brushed and pruned by human hands, forced into the mold of convention. The 
results of some cognitive attempts at human control – e.g. the utter destruction of war – can be completely 
transformative. Usually, however, we exercise cognitive control over our environment in ways that make it 
less likely to bring about this kind of experience. The wild aspects of nature because they are wild, free 
from this kind of control, take one into the unknown, something entirely new, not into consideration of the 
imprints left by humans. There are a few reasons to think this.  
Consider first a, purely speculative, reason to think that wild nature is more likely to bring about a 
transformative experience than convention that derives from observation of aesthetic practice. Art schools 
do not often pick stereotypical fashion models for artists to look at.43 Rather, the models that are chosen are 
wilder, they do not look like typical models brushed and primped in the usual way. It is the genuineness 
that is important to inspiration and creation. If typical fashion models were used, then the artist might well 
stay within the realm of the customary, the fashion magazines, the pornography, and the cultural 
stereotypes with which they are familiar. Perhaps it is the wild, unaffected models that inspire us and 
enable us to move away from convention rather than toward it. Experiencing the wild may encourage artists 
to see the world in new ways and seeing wild aspects of nature as wild may engender a unique re-patterning 
of experience.  One may learn through these experiences how to see the world differently.44  
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Despite this inspirational impact, wilderness is not the only way one can get reconfigurative 
aesthetic value. Good art works (especially upon their first discovery) may likewise fail to fit easily into our 
conceptual categories. Many conceptual and avant-gaurde art works are difficult to conceptualize. Some 
‘profound’ and ‘sublime’ art is characterized as ‘beyond us’ and might, in that way, be transformative. 
Some aesthetically powerful objects are wonderfully stylized and completely artificial, and some 
human art can give us wild experiences; convention can even take us toward wildness. It was Marilyn 
Monroe, for instance, (a woman fitting the western cultural ideal of beauty) who inspired wildness in De 
Kooning’s painting.45  
                    
 
http://www.usc.edu/schools/annenberg/asc/projects/comm544/library/images/435.html 
 
Or consider Gauguin’s work. Gauguin’s wild picture Fatata Te Miti was clearly inspired by Hiroshige’s 
work, and Hiroshige was, primarily, a conventional painter.  
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http://www.artofeurope.com/gauguin/gau4.htm 
Fatata Te Miti portrays a deep appreciation of the wild inspired by convention.46  
The conventional and the wild can also function beautifully side by side, and even enhance each 
other. Consider, for instance, the work of Hiroshige himself: Coexisting along side the conventional objects 
in his picture Pine like a Full Moon in Ueno Park, is a truly wild tree.  
 
http://www.artchive.com/artchive/H/hiroshige/moonpine.jpg.html 
An exception can sometimes prove a rule.  
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Nevertheless, something would be lost without the wildness. Drawing conventional still lifes can 
be very important in helping students hone their skills of observation and imitation, and practice imitating 
the conventional may provide students with the time to perfect their technique. I believe, however, that 
doing so is not likely to inspire the students or change the way the students see things. The important point 
is not that the uninfluenced itself is necessarily an aesthetic ideal, but that it often enables the aesthetic 
experience in a unique way.  
There are some reasons non-aesthetic reasons why one may fail to have a transformative aesthetic 
experience in the wilderness. It may be difficult to have such an experience, for instance, if one is 
extremely uncomfortable. The desert is beautiful at night but hard to endure on a mid-summer afternoon or 
if one has just fallen into a Saguaro cactus. The flies may be so distracting that one fails to attend to the red 
earth and pale green of Australia’s sublime (if not beautiful) hills. 
Nevertheless, at least in the absence of such confounding factors, wild nature is more likely to 
bring about the transformative aesthetic experience than modified nature (never mind most art). The 
playgrounds made for humans at the forests’ edge may pale once one realizes they are not really 
wilderness. Even if one never knows that one is looking at a fake, one is still less likely to encounter things 
that take one away from the expected, the conventional, the post-card pictures of nature. Wilderness’ 
transformative potential is usually greater than more mixed and influenced environments’.  
In the absence of confounding factors, another reason wilderness is especially likely to engender 
the transformative aesthetic experience stems from this fact: To have a transformative aesthetic experience, 
it helps to attend to the object without trying to control the experience or shape it into what one would like 
it to be. Wild objects are harder to control. They do not fit into our conceptual categories as easily as many 
art works. So, they are more likely to bring about the transformative aesthetic experience than most art. On 
the assumption that wild nature is more likely to be wild than modified nature or art, wild nature is more 
likely to bring about the transformative aesthetic experience. 
There is some psychological evidence that things that do not fall easily into our conceptual 
categories, but for which we have such categories, are most likely to bring about the gestalt shift in 
perception. For, there is evidence that it is neither the completely familiar nor unfamiliar which is most 
likely to bring about the shift. Consider first, how people respond to the completely unfamiliar.  
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Writing to John Locke in 1694, William Molyneux raised the following puzzle:  
Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a Cube, 
and a Sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and 
t'other; which is the Cube, which the Sphere. Suppose then the Cube and Sphere placed on a 
Table, and the Blind Man to be made to see. Quaere, Whether by his sight, before he touch'd them, 
he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube. Or Whether he Could 
know by his Sight, before he stretch'd out his Hand, whether he Could not Reach them, tho they 
were Removed 20 or 1000 feet from Him?47 
 
In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke said that experience would be necessary. Berkeley 
agreed, while Leibnitz, Lee, and Synge disagreed.48  
As it turns out, people who are first able to see late in life have trouble making sense of most of 
their visual experiences. The newly sighted cannot even perceive objects as objects. In An Anthropologist 
on Mars, Oliver Sacks explains the phenomenon. When the man called S.B. was first able to see he was 
“‘struck by how objects changed their shapes when he walked round them... He would look at a lamp post, 
walk round it, stand studying it from a different aspect, and wonder why it looked different and yet the 
same.’”49 Sachs suggests: 
All newly sighted subjects, indeed, have radical difficulties with appearances, finding 
themselves suddenly plunged into a world that for them may be a chaos of continually 
shifting, unstable, evanescent appearances. They may find themselves completely lost in 
this flux of appearances, which for them is not yet securely anchored to a world of 
objects, a world of space.50 
 
Nor can the newly-sighted see the kinds of optical illusions that cause a gestalt shift in perception in normal 
subjects (even though some monkeys experience these shifts).51 
Similarly, Sacks says that when “people who have lived their entire lives in a dense rainforest, 
with a far point no more than a few feet away, are brought into a wide, empty landscape, they may reach 
out and try to touch the mountaintops with their hands; they have no concept of how far the mountains 
are.”52 Young children, too, take a long time to learn to see objects. 
Sometimes newly sighted subjects can experience the gestalt shift required to see things as objects 
by familiarizing themselves with their various dimensions. When another congenitally blind man regained 
his sight and went to the zoo he was unable to see the gorillas. But after exploring a life sized statue of a 
gorilla with his hands he reported being able to see them. Soon, the man collected toy objects of all sizes to 
explore with his hands, which helped him see many everyday objects.53 
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What is perhaps more remarkable (though perhaps so obvious that I know of no one has found it 
worth remarking upon) is the fact that most of the time normal adults used to seeing objects as objects 
cannot see them any other way. We cannot see things as anything but unified objects.54  
It is not only sight that works this way. Those who are first able to hear later in life often “find 
themselves, at least initially, in a world of auditory chaos, or agnosia.”55 While those of us who hear voices 
as voices, music as music, and so forth, cannot easily experience sound any other way. 
Or, consider a less extreme example. At first, when people are given glasses that make the world 
appear upside down or sideways people can only see the world as upside down or sideways. Eventually, 
they can see the world as right side up. After weeks with the glasses, they can no longer see the world as 
upside down or sideways. Then, if they remove the glasses, the world appears to be sideways or upside 
down even without glasses.56 The completely familiar, it seems, is as unlikely to bring about the gestalt 
shift as the completely unfamiliar. 
Rather, it is plausible that the gestalt shift occurs most easily with wild objects that are not 
completely unfamiliar or completely conventional. For, wild objects just are those that fall in the realm 
between complete familiarity and utter strangeness. Again, this paper is assuming there is a contingent 
connection between wilderness and the wild and wild nature is usually wilder than art objects. So, wild 
nature is more likely than other natural objects and art to bring about this experience. 
Most people have had some experience with parts of wild nature, we have seen wild trees and 
bushes, but rarely venture beyond the city to see the gnarled, twisting forests of untrimmed wilderness.57 
Most are relatively unfamiliar with the wilderness itself, though they are not as unfamiliar with the wild as 
those who have never seen or heard are with objects or voices. The psychological evidence suggests that it 
is in the realm between complete familiarity and strangeness, in the realm of wild(er)ness that people are 
most likely to experience the gestalt shift in perception that is essential to the transformative aesthetic 
experience.  
If these arguments are right, they may help explain why we tend to find that our appreciation of 
natural environments increases with the number of wild elements they contain. I believe many people find 
more aesthetic value in golf courses than in parking lots, and more aesthetic value in nature reserves than in 
parks. If so, this paper may help explain this fact.  
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The preceding arguments do not give us a metric for all aesthetic value. There may be other sorts 
of objects with aesthetic value in mixed environments that natural ones lack, like glorious sculptures or 
designs. Some natural things may completely lack aesthetic value or have negative value. Furthermore, it 
seems false that it is just the number of wild things in a given area that increases that area’s value. Both 
rarity and diversity probably have a role to play in enhancing our aesthetic appreciation, and some wild 
things may have more aesthetic value than others.  
This paper has only tried to establish that wilderness, because it is wild, is especially likely to 
bring about the transformative aesthetic experience. Natural objects can be artifactualized in pleasant ways 
(as in Japanese gardens and parks).58 Still, this section has argued that the wild elements of nature are 
especially likely to give rise to this kind of aesthetic experience.59  
Nature’s transformative aesthetic value gives us (one) reason to preserve wilderness.  This is so 
even if these other objects can give rise to different kinds of aesthetic experiences. We value a variety of 
different sorts of aesthetic experience. We would lose much of this value if many wild natural objects were 
destroyed. At least, if one values the mere existence of valuable things, this paper gives one reason to 
preserve wilderness.60 Wild nature’s aesthetic value is not necessarily enough to warrant preservation in a 
particular case of conflicting interests and values, but it counts for something.  
VI. Objections and Responses 
 
One might object that influenced environments have at least as much aesthetic value as wild ones. 
So, one might argue, our reasons for preserving non-natural things outweigh our reasons for preserving 
wild things. If this is true, more needs to be done to provide a basis for protecting the environment than 
simply appreciating its wild elements.  
In order to ground this objection, however, one would have to provide an argument to the affect 
that the aesthetic value of influenced environments is at least as great as wilderness’. One must at least 
argue for one of the following propositions: 1) Influenced nature has a sort of value wild nature lacks and 
these values are commensurable, or 2) the aesthetic experience of influenced environments is at least as 
likely to yield transformative aesthetic value as the aesthetic experience of wild environments. Some 
influenced objects give rise to transformative aesthetic value. In light of the above arguments, however, 
there is little reason to think that influenced objects are as likely to yield transformative aesthetic value as 
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wild objects. Since most wild natural objects are wild, uncontrolled, unique, and have their own way of 
developing, they are more likely than most influenced objects to yield transformative aesthetic experiences. 
This gives us at least a prima facie reason to protect wild nature. So, if the objection is to go through, there 
must be another sort of aesthetic value in influence. Even if it is possible to give a convincing account of 
aesthetic value that is more applicable to influenced than wild environments, however, there is little reason 
to think that all value can be captured on a single quantitative scale. Not all value is substitutable, and this 
paper has explained this. The differences between aesthetic objects are qualitative. If a wild object is 
destroyed, the content of the aesthetic experience of that object is lost, for that aesthetic experience 
essentially involves that object. One can make paintings of paintings (or of trees) but this will not suffice to 
replace the aesthetic object. For, the content of a particular aesthetic object involves that object. 
Another objection is that the above account cannot explain the reason why we value ecosystems. 
For, on this account, the content of the aesthetic experience involves sensory information, and one cannot 
have a sensory experience of most ecosystems. So, one might argue, the account of transformative aesthetic 
value cannot provide a reason to preserve ecosystems. This is particularly worrying because many 
environmentalists have found aesthetic value in ecosystems. In fact, one of the most famous quotes in the 
environmental ethics literature is Leopold’s contention that ‘a thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.’61 Speaking of 
ecosystems, environmentalists as diverse as Bryan Norton, Henry Thoreau, and Aldo Leopold have argued 
that we should put ‘faith in the power of observation and experience to transform worldviews.’62 So, any 
theory that cannot explain this value is inadequate.  
The objection supposes however, that aesthetic appreciation is static. It is possible to avoid this 
worry as long as an aesthetic appreciation can contain a temporal dimension. Though one cannot view the 
whole of most ecosystems at once, the sensory content of an ecosystem can be processed over time. A 
temporal dimension of aesthetic experience is necessary for most aesthetic theories to be plausible. This is 
obvious as long as one is not fixated on the visual arts. A temporal dimension is necessary, however, even 
for appreciating paintings. Consider Vic Muniz’s paintings of chocolate people.  
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http://www.renabranstengallery.com/Muniz_Descent.html 
In order to see the people in this painting one must stand back away from the surface, but to see that the 
people are really made out of chocolate, one needs to get close to the surface. To appreciate works of art 
like the chocolate people one must experience the painting over time. Furthermore, it is necessary for any 
plausible theory of the aesthetic experience of wilderness to allow aesthetic experience to extend over time. 
For, it was already noted that wild objects are special, in part, because they develop in their own ways. To 
use an idea from Kate Rawles, wilderness has its own ethos of development or natural unfolding and this 
contributes to its aesthetic value.63  
The transformative account of aesthetic value may also help to arbitrate an important debate in 
environmental ethics. While some environmental ethicists have tried to extend the realm of rights to non-
human individuals, others have argued that ‘extensionism is hopelessly atomistic and individualistic,’64 the 
transformative account of aesthetic appreciation of nature may provide us with a way of seeing value in 
both individuals and ecosystems. It may provide a way to ‘combine the holistic view with individualistic 
considerations, taking each into account...’65-66 We value wilderness as the context of wild objects. Wild 
objects likewise make up the wilderness. By realizing this, one may learn to appreciate both the regional 
and global properties of the wild world because they are in part constitutive of our aesthetic experience of 
wild nature. 
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